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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
test of Schenck v .United States s to obscenity statutes, completing the trend
toward a more liberal and modern approach to literature of all types. How-
ever, for the present time, the Court has placed obscenity statutes clearly
within the due process clause of fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, and has given fair warning to the states that they cannot
arbitrarily restrict the sale of literature.
JOHN M. THoMsoN
REAL PROPERTY -TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES-
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION FROM ESTATE
OF DECEASED SPOUSE
Husband and wife executed notes and purchase money mortgages on
Florida properties which they owned as tenants by the entireties. After the
death of the husband, the wife sued her husband's executor for contribu-
tion and exoneration with respect to the balance owed on these notes and
mortgages. Held, a surviving spouse is not entitled to contribution or ex-
oneration from the estate of a deceased spouse for money due on notes and
purchase money mortgages executed by them where land was held by entire-
ties. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
This was a case of first impression in the Florida court, but the ques-
tions presented have been passed upon in several of the twenty jurisdictions
which recognize tenancy by entireties.t Exoneration in respect of liens on
entireties properties has generally been denied the surviving spouse.2 I How-
ever, decisions are in sharp conflict as to the right to contribution.
The courts of Indiana, :' Maryland,4 New Jersey,5 North Carolina,6 Penn-
sylvania7 and Tnnssee8 hold that the decedent's estate is liable for half
28. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). "Whether the words used, are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils. .. ."
In Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the appellant unsuccessfully
argued the applicability of the clear and present danger test to his conviction under the
New York statute prohibiting sale of obscene publications. See Lockhart and McClure,
Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954).
I. Those jurisdictions which recognize entireties are: Arkansas, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Indiana. Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
For a tabulation of conflicting attributes of entireties tenures in the several states,
see Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951). However, this exxcellent
survey does not evaluate a survivor's right to contribution.
2. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930); Gardner
v. Waldman,-R.l.-,1l1 A.2d 922 (1955).
3. Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919).
4. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 At!. 444 (1930).
5. Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N.J.Eq. 119, 156 Atd. 483 (1931).
6. Underwood v. Ward, 239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954); Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930).
7. In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa.519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); In re Kershaw's
Estate, 352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945).
8. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931).
CASE COMMENTS
of the balance of a purchase money debt. They regard husband and wife
as joint and equal principals who come under "the general rule applicable
to co-obligors that as between them, when one of them pays more than his
proportionate share of the debt owed by both, the payer is entitled to con-
tribution from the other."" These jurisdictions consider unity of the person
an incident of the estate created by the conveyance, and not an incident of
the obligation. They also recognize, as Florida does,10 that the mortgagees
could have discarded the mortgage entirely and have maintained an action
against either the widow or the decedent's estate for the balance of the note.
On the other hand, Massachussetts" and New York 12 deny contribution
to the survivor on purchase money debts where property was held by the
entireties. These courts hold that the decedent no longer has an interest
which would be benefited by discharging a mortgage on the property, since
the survivor became sole owner upon the spouse's death.
The decision in the instant case could have been sustained on the grounds
that the widow had not actually paid the balance due on the notes before
she sued for contribution," but the Florida court proceeded to deny such a
right even if payment had been made. Further, the opinion characterized
the debt of a purchase money mortgage on entireties property as "a debt
being owed wholly by the wife, and simultaneously wholly by the hus-
band,"' 4 with the result that "each spouse, as between themselves, is obli-
gated to pay the full amount thereof."' 5
It is submitted that the decision in the Lopez case is but another anom-
alous corollary to the continued existence in Florida of the anomalous estate
by entireties. This opinion by the Florida court, "in order to be consistent
with our holdings on the nature of an estate by entireties,"'- construed the
mortgages and notes to be ab initio a sort of obligation by entireties, the
ultimate liability of which falls on the spouse who happens to survive.
Such an interpretation goes beyond the New York and Massachussetts
opinions denying contribution, which concede that husband and wife were
joint principals but insist that any right of contribution is extinguished with
the death of one spouse. The announced Florida rule, if carried to its full
9. Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So.2d 608, 609 (Fla. 1955). Here the Florida court
was speaking of tenants in common rather than by entireties.
10. Taylor v. American Nat'l Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912).II. Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).
12. Robinson v. Bogert, 187 Misc. 735, 64 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Surr. Ct., Westch. Co.
1946); In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276 N.Y.S. 960 (Surf. Ct., Orange Co. 1935);Geldart v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y.S. 238(2nd Dep't 1924).13. "Contribution ... is the right of one who has discharged a common liability
or burden to recover of another also liable the aliquot portion which he ought to pay
or bear." (Italics supplied.) 18 C.J.S., Contribution § 1 (1939). (However, all the
cases which have allowed contribution have not insisted on payment as a condition
precedent.)
14. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So.2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1956).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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implications, is not only contrary to the understanding of the contracting
parties and to the established nature of jointly executed obligations' 7 but
also would necessarily lead to the futher anomalous result of precluding even
the mortgagee from suing the decedent's estate.
Two solutions present themselves for consideration. First, Florida
should join those states which have concluded that tenancy by entiretics
is a category of ownership "no longer sufficiently useful to justify its separate
existence."' 8 In view of Florida's historical legislative policy against the
common law doctrine of survivorship, 9 its constitutional abolition of the
disability of married women to own separate property,20' and the equally per-
suasive tax disadvantages inherent in ownership by entireties, -' continued
recognition of the doctrine is anachronistic.22
But if, on the other hand, tenancy by entireties must cudure in Flor-
ida, questions arising from its peculiar incidents should be decided with
regard to all the equities of the particular fact situation, instead of by
attempts to comport with the fictitious attributes of a medieval concept.
Clothing the purchase money mortgage and note with the ambiguous char-
acteristics of the entireties property would seem to be a backward step.
LUCILLE FLEISCIHER
17. Contrast with the positive statements in WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 343 (1936).
18. 4 POWELL, REAL PROPFRTY § 664 (1954).
19. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1951) as originally enacted in 1829 denied survivorship
without exception. The statute was amended in 1941 to exclude tenancies by entirety.
20. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (1885).
21. For some disadvantages, see Bernstein, Tax Dangers in Tenancy by Entireties,
1 MIAMI L.Q. 86 (1947). (The 1954 internal Revenue Code modifies these to a
degree.)
22. Elimination of this form of ownership was recommended by the Committee
on Substantive Changes in Real Property Principles of the American Bar Association
in 1944. See Niles, Abolish Tenancy by Entireties, 79 'TRUSTS & ESTATES 366 (1944).
The accident of the acceptance of the entireties doctrine in Florida is told in
Ritter, A Criticism of the Estate by the Entirety, 5 U.FLA.L.REv. 153 (1952). For
other incongruous results of the doctrine, see Mayer, The Status of Entireties in Florida,
5 MIAMI L.Q. 592 (1951).
